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By Ferry Biedermann, freelance journalist working both in the UK 
and in Europe. He has contributed to the Financial Times, CNBC, 
the Washington Post, Trouw newspaper in the Netherlands and 
many others. He is also a former correspondent in the Middle 
East for the FT and Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant. 
It’s a challenge to think of Brexit in modern terms because the whole 
idea seems like such a throwback to earlier times when the nation-
state was a much more dominant centre of power and European 
countries were constantly at each other’s throat. 
This is not helped by the fact that many Leave voters were older and 
that much analysis points up the tribal politics that is has engendered. 
Is there a modern take, meaning simply one that uses forward looking 
ideas, on the phenomenon not only of Brexit but also of other 
separatist and nationalist, not to say populist, movements in Europe 
and elsewhere? 
It is a pertinent question because if there is not, then it appears that 
we’re at a grave risk of going down the same old, well-trodden road 
towards escalating competition between nations, conflict and possibly 
violence. 
Framing Brexit as a backlash against globalisation or migration is not 
giving it a modern explanation, these are reactions and retrograde. 
There is more to be gained from highlighting the changes that have 
taken place in the world over the last couple of decades: new 
international rules and agreements make it easier for individual 
countries to operate and trade across the globe without being part of a 
powerful trade bloc and technological change making this more 
practical. 
Maybe so, but why then the emphasis on new trade deals? Also, the 
international mesh of rules and regulations will mean that much of a 
promised increase in independence is illusory. Technological 
innovation offers new opportunities but is still not able to trump the 
realities of proximity, as the UK is finding out among others from its 
inability to find adequate technological solutions to the Irish border 
issue. 
It seems the one truly modern explanation for Brexit lies in the 
changed situation of the United Kingdom itself and the realisation that 
it has let go of its Great Power status, not only in the world but now 
also in Europe and more crucially, at home. More specifically, it is 
about English heartbreak over first losing an empire and now being in 
danger of shedding the parts that constitute the UK. 
The EU and its predecessors were conceived in the post-WWII era as 
a way of doing things differently, a modern solution to the age-old 
problem of competing powers in Europe. Wars in Europe had been 
extremely costly to the UK, which had been unable to prevent them 
through its balance of power game. 
Taking a new approach, cooperation, was worth a shot, even for a 
Britain that was still in many ways tethered to its imperial past. Apart 
from the economic imperatives in the 1960’s and 70’s, the UK’s power 
brokers must have realised that membership of the EEC offered a 
way of continuing its great power objective on the continent by 
different means. Membership facilitated keeping both the Germans 
and the French in check and embodied as such an old objective in a 
new guise. 
What has changed over the years is the British view of its role in 
Europe. No longer does the UK see itself as either interested in – or 
capable of – affecting events on the continent. The supposed 
outreach to Hungary earlier this month was a faint echo of the kind of 
games that Whitehall used to play much more adroitly, and certainly 
more frequently, in the past. 
Britain’s realisation that it is now just one of many players in Europe, 
may well be what drives Brexit. It is retrograde in its pique but 
contains a modern, post-imperial, post-colonial realisation. Its 
immediate roots are likely to lie in more recent developments that 
diminished the emphasis on military might: The end of the cold war, 
the fall of the Wall and German reunification. 
Particularly the latter drove home the fact that the balance of power 
was changing on the continent, along with much genuine and 
understandable anguish that found its expression in uncharacteristic 
anti-German broadsides in the British press that helped fan 
nationalism. 
The end of the Cold War helped set loose the genie of nationalism in 
many other European countries for a plethora of reasons, among 
them the lack of a common enemy, the growing inequality that had 
been kept in check during the competition with the Soviets and 
increased migration, including from Eastern Europe. 
In the UK, and in England in particular, these elements also played a 
role, yet the end of the Cold War initially offered a way forward, 
expressed in the early Blair years and Cool Britannia. As well as in the 
Good Friday agreements and devolution. While the Good Friday 
agreements were largely forgotten once the violence had abated, 
devolution remained an important driver of Brexit in that it increased 
English resentment and nationalism; let’s face it, Brexit is an English 
rather than a British phenomenon. 
While devolution, decentralisation and a measure of self-rule fit into 
the modern political discourse, the centrifugal forces that were set into 
motion by it, do not. It is one thing to have autonomy, it’s an entirely 
different proposition to return to the fragmented and competing 
polities that existed before the UK and the EU. 
Whatever the results of this round of Brexit, because whatever 
happens, it is likely to go through a few more rounds in the coming 
decades, the solution lies in the way the UK feels about itself: 
Whether it can see itself as a medium-large power that is best-served 
by cooperating with its immediate neighbours and whether the English 
can rebuild their ties with the other constituent parts of the UK, 
particularly Scotland. 
Northern-Ireland is a completely different ball game, of course. 
 
